



Sacred and Revolutionary: Propaganda Analysis of South Korean and North Korean Online News Articles on Mount Paektu

Murad Asgarov ✉ 

Department of Political Science and International Relations, Western Caspian University, Baku, Azerbaijan

Abstract. Following North Korea's adoption of the "Two hostile states theory" in December 2023, the symbolic role of Mount Paektu—a core element of Korean national identity and former pro-unification rhetoric—requires re-examination. It remains unclear how propaganda in both Koreas constructs "Us vs. Them" narratives around this mountain after the ideological shift. This paper aims to compare two online news articles covering visits to Mount Paektu: one from North Korea's Rodong Sinmun (2026) and one from South Korea's Jogye Order Buddhist website (2024). The goal is to compare political rhetoric in a changed ideological environment. This is going to be achieved by identifying propaganda techniques used to construct Us vs. Them narratives. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) method is applied, focusing on seven techniques (name calling, glittering generalities, transfer, testimonial, plain folks, card stacking, bandwagon). Four techniques appear: name calling, transfer, testimonial, and bandwagon. The North Korean text uses name calling and transfer to link journalists to the anti-Japanese struggle and the Kim dynasty's "eternal bloodline," creating an exclusively northern "Us." The South Korean text uses transfer ("peace pilgrimage"), testimonial, and bandwagon to emphasize inter-Korean and generational unity, even citing the pan-Korean hero Hong Beom Do, thus constructing a unifying, pan-Korean "Us." Both identify imperial Japan as "Them." Despite sharing the same genre and national symbol, the two texts employ propaganda techniques to produce diverging Us vs. Them narratives—one northern-exclusive, one pan-Korean—each aligning with its respective state's current official stance.

Keywords: *propaganda, Inter-Korean Relations, online news, Mount Paektu, Mountain Tourism*

Received: 09.08.2026 **Accepted:** 14.09.2026 **Published:** 25.09.2026

<https://doi.org/10.54414/YGLC3051>

Copyright: © 2026 by the authors. Licensee: The Research Journal of Mountains: Biodiversity, Landscapes and Cultures, Western Caspian University, Baku, Azerbaijan. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0) (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).

1. Introduction

Mount Paektu (Also spelled Mount Baekdu and called Mount Changbai when translated from Mandarin) is the tallest mountain on the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria, located at the border of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter North Korea) and the People's Republic of China (hereafter China). Until recently, both North Korea and the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea) claimed the entire territory of the peninsula to be their sovereign territory. North Korea dropped its claim in late 2023. South Korea still claims the territory of North Korea, including the Korean side of Mount Paektu, while North Korea does not have identical claims against the South.

My previous analysis focused on the narrative present in both North and South Korean propaganda. Namely, the narrative of children in military conflicts. That analysis demonstrated how similar narratives are used elsewhere, such as in relation to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, and other conflicts historically. In contrast, this study focuses on an image more specific to the Korean Peninsula in particular:



Mount Paektu, which can be described as the very starting point of the Korean Peninsula, as it is situated in the very north of North Korea. This focuses the current paper on a less universal and more local image used in propaganda in Korea.

This analysis will compare two online news articles covering visits to Mount Paektu by South Korean pilgrims on the one side, and North Korean journalists on the other. One article was retrieved from the North Korean Rodong Sinmun website (Rodong Sinmun 2026), and the other from the South Korean Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism's National Community Promotion Headquarters website (Ministry of Unification 2026). The North Korean article titled "The Marching Group of the Journalists Union of Korea to the Revolutionary Battle Sites in the Mt. Paektu Area Departed" (조선기자동맹 백두산지구 혁명전적지답사행군대 출발) covers a ceremonial visit of Mount Paektu by journalists, while the South Korean article covers a pilgrimage of a South Korean religious group to it.

The two texts will be analyzed using the Institute for Propaganda Analysis method (hereafter the IPA method) to identify techniques of propaganda. The techniques used will compare the language of the two texts, allowing examination of in-text Us vs. Them narratives.

North Korean propaganda is well researched. Gabroussenko demonstrates how the image of South Korea within North Korean propaganda evolved until 2010 (Gabroussenko 2011). By comparing two texts, the current analysis will contribute to a clearer view of the evolving situation.

Andrei Lankov examined how South Korea targets North Korea through its propaganda. He describes the phenomenon as "war by other means", like the established term "hybrid warfare". He describes how South Korean messaging is projected at North Koreans. This is a policy that is more favored by right-wing South Korean governments, which refer to it as "psychological warfare (Lankov 2011). However, psychological warfare has both internal and external aspects, which are not clearly reflected in Lankov's paper. Consequently, this analysis will examine texts tailored to domestic audiences.

In recent decades, two events can be identified as breakthroughs in the field of propaganda analysis. One was the examination of propaganda used during the Rwandan Genocide (Yanagizawa-Drott 2014). The second has been the proliferation and popularization of LLMs (Liu et al. 2025). The study of the Rwandan Genocide case has sharpened our understanding of how propaganda spreads, while LLMs allow researchers to work with large data sets more efficiently. However, it is also crucial for media literacy to demonstrate how propaganda language can be identified, and how it can be done at the level of individual texts that readers can come across online. This is why the current analysis focuses on a comparison of the language of propaganda used in two texts.

2. Context

The South Korean article was published on September 2, 2024, while the North Korean article was published on March 19, 2026. These texts were published in the aftermath of a crucial event in the history of the Korean Peninsula: North Korea's adoption of the Two Hostile States theory (적대적 두 국가론) in December 2023. Since the inception of South and North Korea, the two states have continuously claimed, respectively, to be the only legitimate state on the Korean Peninsula, thus claiming the territory of the other as their own. However, with the adoption of the Two Hostile States theory, North Korea now recognizes South Korea as a separate and independent state. Moreover, South Korea has now been officially declared an enemy of the North Korean state. Additionally, this move caused the abolition and destruction of North Korean propaganda that promoted reunification with the southern counterpart. For instance, the iconic Arch of Reunification in Pyongyang was dismantled in January 2024. Meanwhile, South Korea continues to claim the North as its own territory, with the Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea still functioning as a part of the South Korean government.



Mount Paektu plays an important symbolic role in Korean identity and has been used in particular in pro-unification rhetoric. For instance, the September 2018 Inter-Korean Summit between the President of South Korea, Moon Jae-in, and the Supreme Leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un was concluded with the two of them paying a visit to Mount Paektu. The photo of the two of them holding hands with the mountain peaks and the Heavenly Lake (a volcanic crater lake of Mount Paektu) in the background, and the two first ladies standing next to them, was spread in international media. In another photo, President Moon is seen filling a plastic bottle with water from the Heavenly Lake.

Moon was quoted as having told Kim, “Many people in the South would go to Mount Paektu from the China side, but I decided not to, pledging myself that I would go stepping on our soil.” A quote by Kim addressed to Moon reads, “The Chinese envy us because they can’t go down to the lake from their side, but we can <...> We should write another chapter of history between the North and the South by reflecting our new history on this Heaven Lake.” North Koreans greeted Moon at the airport next to the mountain, chanting “Motherland! Unification!” (Reuters 2018).

In addition to that, the mountainous landscape can also be seen on the wall image behind the two heads of state during the earlier April 2018 Inter-Korean Summit between the two sides, with them holding their hands up in the same way as they would later on Mount Paektu in one of the photos (Lee 2018). However, this occurred before the fundamental 2023 shift in North Korean rhetoric. Inter-Korean relations have been going back and forth (Lankov 2018). However, when it comes to the reunification rhetoric, it does not look like there is a way to backtrack on this issue anymore. Therefore, it is particularly interesting to catch a glimpse of the role of Mount Paektu in this recently changed ideological environment on the Korean Peninsula.

In North Korea, Mount Paektu is not exclusively used as a symbol of reunification. For instance, it can be found on the National Emblem, as described by Article 169 of the North Korean Constitution: “The national emblem of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea bears the design of a grand hydroelectric power station under Mt. Paektu, the sacred mountain of the revolution <...>” (Democratic People's Republic of Korea 2016).

Similarly, the first line of the South Korean national anthem also mentions Mount Paektu: “Until the East Sea's waters and Baekdu Mountain dry and wear away, May God protect and bless our country for ten thousand years” (National Anthem of the Republic of Korea).

It is important to note that North Korea is officially an Atheist state, and religious practices are strictly controlled by the state. The state sometimes promotes Chondoism in its propaganda, citing its “Rejection of West and Japan” (KCNA 2009). South Korea, in contrast, is a highly religiously diverse country with a wide variety of denominations and religious organizations. Like North Korea, religion in South Korea is frequently associated with Korean nationalism. For instance, the rhetoric of the Unification Church, which was recently banned in Japan (in relation to the issues that led to the assassination of the former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe), has been described as nationalistic (Tizzard 2026). Thus, national ideologies and religions are deeply intertwined in both North and South Korea, which is important to consider when analyzing propaganda coming out of the peninsula.

After the conclusion of the Korean War, South Korean tourists were first officially allowed to visit Mount Paektu from the Chinese side in 1992, as a result of the normalization of relations between South Korea and the PRC (Kristof 1992). In 2005, the Chairwoman of Hyundai Group, Hyun Jeong Eum, met Kim Jong Il. The agreement signed between the two included a clause that allowed South Korean tourists to visit the mountain from the North Korean side as well via charter tours (Seoul Reuters 2005). The 2007 summit between President Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il was concluded with the October 4 Declaration, which launched more regular direct flights for tourism purposes (Roh & Kim 2007). However, in 2008, a South Korean tourist was shot at Mount Kumgang, which led to tourist projects between the two countries

being suspended indefinitely (Jung 2008), thus leaving the PRC route as the only way for South Korean tourists to visit Mount Paektu. Recently, the PRC has eased visa restrictions to multiple countries, including South Korea, which allowed South Korean tourists to visit Mount Paektu from the Chinese side visa-free (Kim 2024). This is why the visit by the South Korean group was conducted via the Chinese side of the border.

3. Methodology

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis was an organization that existed in the US during the interwar period. In one of their publications, they outlined a method of identifying different propaganda techniques. The seven outlined techniques include name calling, glittering generalities, transfer, testimonial, plain folks, card stacking, and bandwagon. These techniques were discussed in a publication by the institute, in which they recommended the use of the seven techniques to analyze political speeches (Institute for Propaganda Analysis 1937).

In contrast, the current study uses the same methodology to comparatively analyze two pieces that belong to a different genre of text, nonexistent at the time of the institute's existence. Namely, the online news article genre. This genre is characterized by hybridity, meaning it can combine elements of various genres. For example, an online news article can contain extracts from a political speech. It is different from the more general genre of news articles in different ways, including the fact that it is able to incorporate more materials from different texts (for example, by including an entire video of a political speech, and not just quotes) due to not being limited by a physical format.



Figure 1. Soviet propaganda poster by Sakharov & Kuzginov 1950.

As suggested by the methodology outlined by the institute, the text is going to be analyzed to find the propaganda techniques. For example, a statement without evidence is going to be counted as an assertion and is going to be analyzed as such based on its respective position within the structure of its text. Analyzing these techniques within two texts will allow us to compare the ways in which they are used in North and South Korea.



Propaganda techniques can be used in each text to construct a Us vs Them narrative. For instance, a Soviet propaganda poster (Sakharov & Kuzginov 1950) does this rather explicitly by being divided into two parts, which are marked with the words “We” and “Them,” and uses the assertion technique of propaganda in combination with contrasting color schemes on both sides in order to portray a positive “Us” and a negative “Them”.

Two texts were chosen due to limitations of the current format. Further analysis of a larger sample of texts is advisable to deepen our understanding of propaganda on the Korean Peninsula. The two texts were chosen due to their shared characteristics, including the fact that they both belong to the same genre of text, and as online news articles, they both present coverage of visits to Mount Paektu, which is a national symbol of all Korean people, which is going to be explored further in the following chapter for context.

4. Results

This section goes through the propaganda techniques that were found in the two texts to compare how they construct Us vs Them narratives. The headline of an online news article is its most important move (Van Dijk 2013). This is the part of the text that most of the audience will see, as frequently, people don’t read the rest of the article after seeing it. This was true already with offline news articles, and it is also the case with online news articles, which tend to be spread on social media via hyperlinks, resulting in most consumers of texts in this genre only interacting with their headlines (and sometimes also subheadlines and the top images).

The abbreviation of the branch of the religious organization is deprived of religiosity. It is called Minchubon (민추본), which roughly translates as National Community Promotion Headquarters. The full name would have been Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism’s National Community Promotion Headquarters (민족공동체추진본부). Korean new religious movements have a strong tendency toward syncretism of religious beliefs with ideas associated with Korean nationalism. For instance, members of the Unification Church believe that Jesus Christ is going to come back as Korean, and the whole world is going to be speaking the Korean language.

Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism does have some syncretic tendencies, typical for Buddhism, as in some of its temples, one can find a Three Shrine Hall, dedicated to three indigenous Korean deities: Sanshin (Mountain God), Chilseong (Seven Stars), and Dokseong (the Recluse) (Jogye 2023). Beyond this religious syncretism, Korean Nationalism is realized in the order’s contemporary practices, as they have a pro-unification stance and have participated in restorations of Buddhist temples in North Korea.

The title of the North Korean article reads “Officials of the National Journalists’ Alliance visited revolutionary battle sites in the Mount Paektu region and held a pledge ceremony” (전국기자동맹일군들 백두산지구 혁명전적지를 답사, 맹세모임 진행). In this case, “revolutionary battle sides” is an example of the name-calling propaganda technique being used. However, in this case, it refers to actual battle sides in which the guerrilla Korean People’s Revolutionary Army (KPRA) fought against the Japanese Army.

Referring to the battle side as “revolutionary” is an important nuance. The author could have referred to the event as a “battle for independence”, for instance, as this was a part of the Korean independence movement, which included parties from all over the Korean peninsula fighting against the Empire of Japan. However, calling it “revolutionary” particularly distinguishes it as being associated with North Korea. The article does not mention the general concept of the Korean independence movement, as well as the fact that KPRA was heavily affiliated with the Soviet Army.

While no propaganda techniques were found in the headline of the South Korean article, its text consists of a series of slogans, which are typical of propaganda language. The third line in particular serves as an



emphasis of the common history of the Korean peninsula: “An anti-Japanese historical site and a sacred mountain of the nation” (“항일 유적지이자 민족의 성산서”).

This is a clear ideological contrast between the two articles. North Korean article uses propaganda language to highlight its role in fighting the Empire of Japan and omits the roles of southern affiliated organizations, as well as that of China. South Korean article emphasizes the common history of the Korean people in their fight for independence by using name-calling. Even though the South Korean article comes from a non-governmental source, both articles have their contents aligned with the official positions of South and North Korean states respectively, in which the first still has an official goal of reunification, while the latter has abandoned this goal.

Online news articles published on the Rodong Sinmun do not have clearly identifiable subheadlines and leads, which are typically distinguished with different fonts. It also lacks images, unlike its South Korean counterpart. Yet, it still follows some of the basic features of online news articles, such as a headline, date, author's name, and a link to a different article on the same website.

Notably, despite this lack of differentiation of specific moves, the text does use bold font for one purpose only: to highlight the names of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un. The names of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are also highlighted by referring to them as “great leader comrade Kim Il Sung” and “great leader comrade Kim Jong Il”, while the latter is referred to as “respected comrade Kim Jong Un”. So, while the text is written in the genre of online news articles, some of its editing is close to propaganda pamphlets and posters, which also tend to highlight ideologically important terms and expressions.

The mention of the three Kims is particularly important in this text, due to its reference to “the eternal bloodline of the Juche revolution” (“주체혁명의 영원한 피줄기”). This bloodline is also known as the Kim dynasty internationally, and as the Paektu Bloodline (“백두혈통”) in North Korea.

The official North Korean historiography claims that Kim Jong Il was born at a secret camp located on Mount Paektu. However, scholars believe that he was born on the territory of the Soviet Union, either in Khabarovsk Krai (Avchenko 2019) or Primorsky Krai (Richardson 2016). The official North Korean narrative ties the Kim dynasty closely to Mount Paektu, while the currently analyzed North Korean text is an example of how North Korean media uses propaganda to reinforce this narrative.

South Korean text has more of the features of an online news article, including images with their descriptions provided. Most of the images use testimonial and bandwagon techniques of propaganda. They depict pilgrims seemingly enjoying their time at Mount Paektu and taking photos. The descriptions highlight this with some reading: “A lot of people on the mountain” (“백두산에 오르는 수많은 인파”), “Thousands of people are climbing up the stairs to see the sky” (“수많은 인파가 천지를 보기 위해 1400여 개 계단을 오르고 있다”).

Thus, the article can also be interpreted as an advertisement of religious tourism in the region, which is organized with the participation of the order. Testimonial and bandwagon techniques of propaganda tend to come in tandem, and they are also typically used in the language of advertisement. This differentiates the South Korean text as having more of a marketing goal, promoting a service, which is not found in the North Korean text, which is affiliated more exclusively with the North Korean state ideology.

Both religious texts, as well as advertisement texts, typically use language of propaganda. Thus, it is not surprising to come across propaganda techniques in such a text. North Korea is also well known for actively using propaganda in its media. Both texts actively use the transfer technique of propaganda. In the North Korean text: “The members of the expedition marching party, emulating the spirit of the anti-Japanese publishing workers, firmly wielded the brush and microphone of the revolution”



(“답사행군대원들은 항일의 출판일군들이 지녔던 정신세계를 본받아 혁명의 붓대와 마이크를 역세계”)

Here, the function of the transfer is to create a positive association between the members of the expedition and the anti-Japanese press of the Korean independence movement. It is further combined with the name-calling “brush and microphone of the revolution”, which strengthens this association. And in the South Korean text, the word “peace” (“평화”) is repeated 24 times throughout the text, including the headline, and twice in the lead, where it is most visible. For example, in the expression “peace pilgrimage” (“평화순례”). The goal here is to associate an act of religious tourism, and by extension, the Order, which organized the tour, with the positive notion of peace. In this case, peace is also associated with a particular notion of Korean nationalism, which favors reunification of the two Koreas. The example given above (“peace pilgrimage”) is a combination of both transfer and name-calling techniques of propaganda.

Thus, both texts use combinations of transfer and name-calling with a goal of creating a positive association that shows the pilgrims (in both cases) in a good light. However, the North Korean association is related to the past, with explicit references to the anti-Japanese struggle of the Korean liberation movement, while the South Korean association is tied to the idea of future peace.

The South Korean text also contains references to the anti-Japanese movement, but they are used differently in this case. It emphasizes the connection between generations of Korean people, as well as between North and South Koreans: “After passing through the anti-Japanese site of Seorin, the tears of the ancestors finally reached the holy mountain of Baekdu, the holy mountain of the people” (“선조들의 피눈물이 서린 항일 유적지를 지나, 마침내 민족 성산인 백두산에 닿았다.”)

This quote emphasizes the connection of the religious tour with the Korean ancestors who fought against the Empire of Japan. The following quote is related to the connection between North and South Koreans: “It is also an anti-Japanese site of our ancestors and a place that symbolizes the pain of a divided homeland. In the area of Baekdusan, many anti-Japanese warriors fought against the Japanese, starting with the medics of Hong Beom Do and the medics.” (“선조들의 항일 유적지이자 분단된 조국의 아픔을 상징하는 장소이기도 하다. 백두산 일대는 구한말 홍범도 의병대를 시작으로 해방까지 수많은 항일 전사들이 일제와 맞서 싸웠다.”)

Hong Beom Do is a national hero of all Korean people (North Koreans, South Koreans, and Central Asian Koreans), who opposed the Empire of Japan. He was born in Chasong County prior to the partition of Korea, located in the very north of Korea. However, in South Korea, his legacy is politically controversial, between the right wing and the left wing, due to his ties to communists. For instance, during the presidency of right-wing Yoon Suk Yeol, it was announced that Hong Beom Do’s bust that was erected in the Korean Military Academy back in 2018 would be removed. This decision was criticized by the South Korean nationalist left wing (The Economist 2023).

Thus, the South Korean article highlights the ties between generations by referencing a national hero of both Koreas, despite his legacy being controversial in the South. Because it is acting as an advertisement for the tour, the South Korean article also contains a series of testimonials, consisting of quotes from some of the participants of the tour, with their names and ages. It is particularly notable that the article also used the same combination of bandwagon and assertion two times, about the age of the participants: “an unusual time when all ages from the 10s to the 70s were together” (“10대부터 70대까지 전 연령이 고루 함께했던



이례적인 시간이었다”). These two assertions contrast with the photos, where most of the participants are elderly people.

The goal here is to portray the pilgrimage as being attended by all kinds of people, to make it more attractive. However, it is counterproductive when contrasted with the photos.

Thus, a total of four kinds of propaganda techniques were identified in the two texts, including name-calling, transfer, testimonial, and bandwagon. And while the topics of the texts were similar, and both belong to the same genre of text, the techniques were used there to push for different narratives. Both narratives that are being pushed by the two texts align respectively with the current official stances of North and South Korea, even though the South Korean text comes from a non-governmental source.

5. Conclusion

This paper compared two texts, both belonging to the online news article genre, covering visits to Mount Paektu, which plays an important symbolic role for both North and South Korea. This site has served both as a symbolic background and a subject of agreements between the two sides, highlighting its importance for inter-Korean relations. South Koreans used to have the right to visit the mountain as tourists under previously existing agreements with the North. Nowadays, they are only allowed to visit the mountain through the Chinese side of the border.

As a result, when covering such a common symbolic denominator for all Korean people, such as Mount Paektu, both North Korean state media and South Korean religious media use propaganda techniques to push narratives that are different in various ways. In the North Korean case, name-calling and transfer techniques have been used to establish a connection between the anti-Japanese struggle and North Korean journalists today, with an emphasis on the revolutionary nature of the fight against the Empire of Japan. It further connects the event with the ruling Kim dynasty by referring to “the eternal bloodline of the Juche revolution”. Thus, this text is a product of what could be called North Korean nationalism, as it connects the historical precedent of animosity with Japan to exclusively North Korean narratives.

The South Korean text uses propaganda techniques, such as name-calling and transfer, to emphasize the connection between the Korean people. Both generational connections, when it talks about the anti-Japanese struggle, it emphasizes the role of the ancestors, without any further ideological specifications linked exclusively to either North or South. Moreover, it uses the name Hong Beom Do, which can be seen as a unifying historical figure for all Korean people.

The difference between the Us vs Them narratives pushed by the two texts is the “Us” part. While them is the Empire of Japan in both texts, the “Us” in the North Korean text is identifiably exclusively northern, while the South Korean text is pushing for a unifying figure of “Us” that is neither exclusively southern nor exclusively northern. More research is needed to continue capturing the evolving ideological situation on the Korean peninsula.

Author's contribution

The sole author is responsible for conceptualizing, collecting, and analyzing data, and writing and editing the manuscript.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Funding

This study did not receive specific funding from governmental, for-profit, or non-profit organizations.



References

1. Avchenko, V. (2019). Vladivostok nakrilo vojdem, Novaya Qazeta.
<https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/04/24/80341-vladivostok-nakrylo-vozhdem>
2. Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (2016). *Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*.
3. Gabroussenko, T. (2011). From developmentalist to conservationist criticism: The new narrative of South Korea in North Korean propaganda. *Journal of Korean Studies*, 16(1): 27–61.
4. Institute for Propaganda Analysis (1937). *Propaganda Analysis*, Vol. 1.
<https://archive.org/embed/IPAVol1>
5. Jogye (2023). Shrine of the Three Sages (삼성각), Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism. Available at:
https://jokb.org/bbs/board.php?bo_table=1020&wr_id=30
6. Jung, H. W. (2008). How did the Mt. Kumgang killing affect the Koreans? Korea Joong Ang Daily.
<https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2008/08/25/etc/How-did-the-Mt-Kumgang-killing-affect-the-Koreas/2894077.html>
7. KCNA (2009). Anniversary of Chondoism Observed. KCNA.
<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200904/news05/20090405-09ee.html>
8. Kim, J. Y. (2024). Strict Chinese customs still apply, despite visa exemption for Korean tourists, Korea JoongAng Daily.
<https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-11-20/business/industry/Koreans-should-prepare-for-Chinese-customs-despite-visa-exemption-Embassy/2182354>
9. Kristof, N. D. (1992). Yanji Journal; In China, the Koreans Shine ('It's Our Custom'). *The New York Times*.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/07/world/yanji-journal-in-china-the-koreans-shine-it-s-our-custom.html>
10. Lankov, A. (2011). Telling the subversive truth: Information dissemination and North Korea's future. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 23(1), 19-35.
11. Lankov, A. (2018). Edinstvo i protivopoložnosti. Dostizhimo li obedinenie Korei. *Moskovskiy Tsentri Karnegi*.
<https://carnegie.ru/commentary/76206>
12. Lee, D. H. (2018). 4 Things You Should Know About the Inter-Korean Summit. VOA.
<https://www.voanews.com/a/four-things-you-should-know-about-the-inter-korean-summit/4373903.html>
13. Liu, J., Ai, L., Liu, Z., Karisani, P., Hui, Z., Fung, Y., & Ji, H. (2025). PropaInsight: Toward deeper understanding of propaganda in terms of techniques, appeals, and intent. In *Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Computational Linguistics* (pp. 5607-5628).
14. Ministry of Unification. (2026, April 16). 진달래 (2024). 백두산 오른 민주 “평화순례는 씨앗을 심는 일”. 민족공동체추진본부.
https://www.unikorea.or.kr/news/press.html?mode=view&code=h2b_press&uid=1057.00&pnt=7&g=&lm=01&ckattempt=3
15. National Anthem of the Republic of Korea. Aegukga (애국가)
16. Reuters (2018) Kim, Moon Visit Mount Paektu as Summit Wraps. VOA News.
<https://www.voanews.com/a/kim-moon-visit-mount-paektu-as-summit-wraps/4579484.html>
17. Richardson, C. (2016). Hagiography of the Kims and the Childhood of Saints. In *Change and Continuity in North Korean Politics* (pp. 123-149). Routledge.
18. Rodong Sinmun. (2026, April 16). 조선중앙통신 (2026). 전국기자동맹일군들 백두산지구 혁명전적지를 답사, 맹세모임 진행. 로동신문.



<http://www.rodong.rep.kp/ko/index.php?OEAYMDI2LTA0LTE2LTA0NEAxOUBA67Cx65GQ7IKwQDEx>

19. Roh, M.H., & Kim, J.I. (2007, October 4). *Declaration on the advancement of South-North Korean relations, peace and prosperity*. Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea.
https://unikorea.go.kr/web/eng_unikorea/bbs/bbs_0000000000000034/31552
20. Sakharov, S., & Kuzginov, K. (1950). *We and them*, Regnum, 1950.
<https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1971061.html>
21. Seoul Reuters (2005). North Korea agrees to expand tourism with Hyundai. The Star.
https://www.thestar.com.my/news/world/2005/07/17/north-korea-agrees-to-expand-tourism-with-hyundai_1
22. The Economist (2023). South Korean politics is one big row about history, The Economist.
<https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/10/26/south-korean-politics-is-one-big-row-about-history>
23. Tizzard D. (2026). The Human Cost of Korean Cults. Korea Deconstructed #126. YouTube.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZO1tmBFKdX8>
24. Van Dijk, T. A. (2013). *News analysis: Case studies of international and national news in the press*. Routledge.
25. Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2014). Propaganda and conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(4), 1947-1994.

