The Freedom Struggle of the Caucasian Highlanders in the XIX Century and the Influence of Mountain Relief on Military Tactics

In this work, we consider the resistance of the Caucasian highlanders during the 19th century in relation to the Caucasian War of 1817-1864 (although several Western authors date this period from 1763 to 1864). We compare the two main centers of geopolitical resistance: the organized resistance headed by Imam Shamil in the Northeast Caucasus (Chechnya and Dagestan), and the more scattered but no less consistent resistance of the Circassians (Adygs) in the Northwest Caucasus. In this work, the main emphasis is placed on the relationship between the geography of the Caucasus mountains – gorges, mountain ranges, forest cover, and mountain auls – and the tactics used by both sides of the conflict: the highlanders and the Russian army. With the help of historical-comparative and descriptive-analytical approaches, this work shows how the geography of the Caucasian mountains was not just the environment for the war, but its active component: it made the highlanders engage in guerrilla tactics instead of fighting in the open field, forced the Russian command to change its operational methods – building roads, deforestation, the policy of settling Cossacks, and building the fortified network. We discuss the emigration (muhajirism) that occurred after the end of military operations in the Northwest Caucasus in 1864: although this process is referred to as genocide by several researchers and several countries (for example, the Georgian Parliament in 2011), the official Russian historiography does not accept this view, and this work presents the dispute objectively, mentioning both points of view. We conclude that neither the duration of the Caucasian War nor the similarities and differences in tactical methods in its two different theaters can be explained without taking into account the decisive role of the terrain.